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#PublicAuthority:	The	Political	Marketplace:	Analyzing
Political	Entrepreneurs	and	Political	Bargaining	with	a
Business	Lens
Alex	De	Waal	demonstrates	how	the	political	marketplace	framework	helps	explain	four	enduring	puzzles	in
contemporary	Africa	and	the	Greater	Middle	East.
This	article	is	part	of	the	#PublicAuthority	blog	series,	part	of	the	ESRC-funded	Centre	for	Public	Authority
and	International	Development.	
	
The	political	marketplace	is	a	contemporary	system	of	governance,	characterized	by	pervasive	monetized	patronage,
in	the	form	of	exchange	of	political	loyalty	or	cooperation	for	payment.	The	countries	where	this	occurs	share	three
principal	features,	namely	(a)	the	dominance	of	inter-personal	political	bargaining	over	formal	rules	and	procedures,
(b)	pervasive	rent-seeking	by	members	of	the	political	and	business	elite,	and	(c)	integration	into	a	global	patronage
order.	The	political	marketplace	is	not	a	transitional	or	outdated	system	that	is	about	to	replaced	by	Weberian	states,
but	a	flexible	and	dynamic	governance	order.
The	framework	of	the	political	marketplace	helps	to	explain	four	enduring	puzzles	in	contemporary	Africa	and	the
Greater	Middle	East:
State-building	is	becoming	harder,	not	easier.	An	earlier	generation	grasped	the	prospect	of	modernity	but	it	now
appears	to	be	beyond	reach.	Despite	a	collective	demand	for	democracy	and	capable	states,	international	technical
assistance,	and	remarkable	economic	growth,	institutionalized	states	seem	more	remote	today	than	half	a	century
ago.
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Large-scale	killing	is	declining	but	volatility	is	increasing.	The	numbers	of	people	killed	in	today’s	conflicts	are
considerably	smaller	than	twenty	or	thirty	years	ago.	Military	coups	and	wars	are	rarer.	But	reduced	violence	does
not	seem	to	translate	into	greater	stability.	More	effort	than	ever	is	invested	in	peace,	and	peace	agreements	are
larger	and	more	complicated	than	ever	before,	but	they	seem	not	to	bring	peace.
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International	security	cooperation	appears	to	sustain,	or	even	generate,	the	insecurity	that	justifies	its	continuation,	or
expansion.	Ever-greater	efforts	and	funds	are	spent	on	stabilization,	counter-terrorism,	and	counter-narcotics,	but	the
ills	targeted	by	these	programs	seem	to	become	ever-more	entrenched,	even	pervading	the	national	institutions	that
are	the	favored	recipients	of	international	support.
Identity	markers	are	becoming	more	salient	but	tribal	and	sectarian	authorities	are	losing	their	status.	For	example,
across	Sudan,	South	Sudan	and	Somalia,	people	report	that	ethnic	and	confessional	conflict	appears	to	be	rising.
But	the	custodians	of	ethnicity—chiefs	and	religious	leaders—have	much	reduced	influence.	The	ethnic	markers
utilized	in	conflict	remain	as	fluid	as	ever,	but	conflict	that	appears	to	be	ethnic	is	more	common.
Political	marketplace	governance	systems	vary	along	four	dimensions,	namely	(a)	whether	they	are	a	hybrid	of
institutionalized	and	patronage-based	orders	or	are	entirely	a	market	in	patron-client	relations,	(b)	the	extent	to	which
political	finance	is	derived	from	external	rents	(mineral	exports,	aid,	security	cooperation,	etc.)	as	opposed	to	other
sources	of	finance	such	as	donations	from	domestic	businessmen,	(c)	whether	control	over	the	organization	of
violence	is	centralized	or	decentralized,	and	(d)	the	terms	on	which	they	are	regionally	and	internationally	integrated.
A	common	manifestation	in	Africa	and	the	Greater	Middle	East	is	a	rentier	political	marketplace	with	dispersed
control	over	the	instruments	of	coercion.	In	these	countries,	political	bargaining	is	conducted	using	violence	or	the
threat	of	violence.	Typically,	intermediate	elites—army	commanders,	tribal	leaders,	provincial	governors	and	the	like
—threaten	or	instigate	mutiny	or	rebellion	in	order	to	obtain	a	larger	share	of	centrally-allocated	rents.	The
characteristics	of	contemporary	political	marketplace	governance	systems	are	particularly	pronounced	in	these
countries,	but	they	are	not	the	only	variant.
The	central	dynamic	in	the	political	management	of	a	political	marketplace	is	the	relationship	between	the	political
budget	and	the	price	of	loyalty.	The	political	budget	refers	to	the	funds	available	to	the	ruler	for	discretionary
spending	on	ensuring	the	loyalty	of	members	of	the	political	elite.	Its	twin	concept	is	the	price	of	loyalty:	the	prevailing
market	rate	for	ensuring	the	allegiance	or	cooperation	for	a	period	of	time	or	a	particular	activity.
The	size	of	the	political	budget	is	a	function	of	the	rents	that	the	ruler	can	obtain	(income),	and	the	demands	on	that
fund	from	members	of	the	political	elite	(expenditure).	It	is	the	heartbeat	of	the	political	marketplace	system,	and	its
health	is	the	indicator	of	regime	survival	or	crisis.
Management	of	the	political	budget	is	the	single	most	important	political	business	management	skill	for	a	political
entrepreneur	or	business	manager.	In	most	political	scientific	analyses	of	states	and	governance	systems,	the	role	of
personal	agency	and	political	skill	is	considered	as	an	extraneous	factor	or	noise.	The	analysis	of	a	political
marketplace,	by	contrast,	demands	attention	to	“real	politics,”	in	Lenin’s	sense	of	“who,	whom”	(cf.	Guess	2008).
Charles	Tilly	called	attention	to	this:
If	protection	rackets	represent	organised	crime	at	its	smoothest,	then	war	risking	and	state	making	–	quintessential
protection	rackets	with	the	advantage	of	legitimacy	–	qualify	as	our	largest	examples	of	organised	crime.	Without
branding	all	generals	and	statesmen	as	murderers	or	thieves,	I	want	to	urge	the	value	of	that	analogy.	At	least	for	the
European	experience	of	the	past	few	centuries,	a	portrait	of	war	makers	and	state	makers	as	coercive	and	self-
seeking	entrepreneurs	bears	a	far	greater	resemblance	to	the	facts	than	do	its	chief	alternatives:	the	idea	of	a	social
contract,	the	idea	of	an	open	market	in	which	operators	of	armies	and	states	offer	services	to	willing	consumers,	the
idea	of	a	society	whose	shared	norms	and	expectations	call	forth	a	certain	kind	of	government.	(1985,	p.	169)
Tilly	left	this	comparison	as	analogy.	I	would	argue	that	this	is	the	reality	of	politics.	When	I	began	using	the	term
“political	marketplace”	and	its	corollaries,	taking	my	cue	from	the	Sudanese	political	vernacular,	I	also	took	it	as
metaphor,	but	soon	realized	that	it	is	not.	This	is	really	how	political	business	is	conducted.	Political	business
management	skills	and	entrepreneurship	are	central	to	regime	functioning,	and	one	of	the	key	tasks	of	the	political
science	of	these	systems	is	specifying	how	politicians	make	these	systems	work,	and	indeed	make	them	work	better.
In	week-to-week	political	management,	the	political	business	manager’s	challenge	is	sustaining	cash	flow	to	the
political	budget	and	ensuring	that	claimants	are	paid,	at	minimum	cost.	In	strategic	planning,	the	ruler	will	want	to
consider	the	options	of	building	a	coercive	capacity	or	invoking	popular	solidarities	by	appeals	to	ethnicity,
nationalism	or	religion,	so	as	to	minimize	the	political	budget	by	using	other	mechanisms	to	generate	loyalty	and
cooperation.
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Let	us	examine	the	four	dimensions	of	the	political	marketplace	system.
First:	the	extent	to	which	political	life	is	regulated	by	formal	and	institutional	rules	and	procedures	as	opposed	to
inter-personal	transactions	and	relationships.
In	a	political	marketplace,	the	main	transaction	is	the	exchange	of	loyalty	over	a	period	of	time,	or	cooperation	in	a
task,	for	resources.	This	exchange	is	usually	monetary,	creating	a	marketplace	of	loyalties.	Supply	and	demand
determines	the	allocation	of	power	and	influence.	For	example,	who	holds	what	position	and	what	they	do	in	that	post
is	determined	by	current	market	conditions	rather	than	formal	rules.	Formal	institutions	are	subordinate	to	these
market-based	transactions.
Insofar	as	political	scientists	have	focused	on	personalized	or	patrimonial	systems	of	political	authority,	their	principal
interest	has	been	how	these	systems	have	made	the	transition	to	formal	institutional	systems.	The	dominant
analyses	of	patronage-based	political	orders	(a.k.a.	“fragile”	or	“post-conflict”	states,	or	what	Douglass	North	and	his
colleagues	(2009)	call	“natural	states”)	are	to	compare	them	unfavourably	with	those	political	orders	that	have
achieved	a	state-building	trajectory.	Notwithstanding	most	scholars’	insistence	that	there	is	no	necessary	progression
from	patronage	orders	to	Weberian	states,	too	often	there	is	an	implicit	assumption	that	such	a	transition	will	occur.
The	framework	of	the	political	marketplace	makes	no	such	assumption,	and	instead	focuses	on	how	informal	or
hybrid	systems	of	governance	are	adapting	to,	and	innovating	within,	the	current	global	political	economy.	Indeed,
part	of	the	analysis	is	how	marketplace	systems	are	capturing	institutionalized	or	developmental	states	and	pushing
them	towards	rent-based	bargaining—state-building	in	reverse.
There	are	varying	degrees	of	(modest)	institutionalization,	between	and	within	countries,	allowing	us	to	investigate
the	conditions	under	which	political	institutions	emerge	and	decay.	Additionally,	we	need	to	attend	to	the	way	in
which	a	political	marketplace	is	itself	an	institution,	regulated	not	by	formal	rules	and	procedures,	but	by	societal
norms	and	shared	expectations.	The	role	of	ethnicity	and	other	forms	of	solidarity	will	be	important	in	regulating	the
marketplace.	In	these	systems,	political	actors	have	little	trust	in	one	another	and	no	trust	at	all	in	the	rule	of	law,	but
they	can	predict	outcomes	based	on	confidence	in	how	actors	will	behave.
Second:	the	extent	to	which	political	finance	are	externally	derived	rents	as	opposed	to	domestic	sources.
Our	concern	is	with	low-	and	middle-income	countries	in	a	subordinate	position	in	the	global	economy.	They	cannot
produce	and	market	agricultural	or	manufactured	products	at	scale	in	an	internationally	competitive	manner.
Business	profits	are	therefore	obtained	primarily	through	rents,	either	directly	(government	contracting	and
investment	in	minerals)	or	indirectly	(obtaining	a	profitable	position	in	a	market	for	services,	or	securing	key	assets	at
a	discount,	courtesy	of	governmental	sponsorship).
In	a	rentier	system,	the	ruler	relies	on	exporting	minerals,	security	cooperation	assistance	from	global	powers,	aid,
the	payoffs	from	transnational	organized	crime,	or	the	financial	rewards	from	serving	as	a	client	to	another	ruler	in
the	region	or	beyond.	The	simpler	specifications	of	the	political	marketplace	apply	in	single-source	rentier	states,
notably	oil	exporters,	where	the	ruler	has	little	room	for	maneuver	in	negotiating	rental	income.	Where	the	ruler’s
rental	income	is	from	aid,	security	cooperation,	crime	or	sovereign	rents,	skills	in	generating	rentier	opportunities	and
accessing	rents	are	important.	These	sources	of	finance	also	have	the	complication	that	financiers	may	also	have
other	options	for	intervening	in	the	market,	for	example	by	sponsoring	insurgents	(see	below).
Externally	derived	rents	are	the	main	mechanism	whereby	low-	and	middle-income	countries	in	Africa	and	the
Greater	Middle	East	(and	possibly	elsewhere)	are	integrated	into	the	emergent	global	patronage	order.
In	a	system	financed	by	political	funds	from	domestic	sources	(which	here	include	foreign	wage	earners	who	provide
remittances),	political	business	managers	obtain	their	political	finance	by	bargaining	with	business	leaders.	This	is
not	a	rentier	system	in	the	sense	that	government	revenues	and	political	budgets	are	external	rents.	Nonetheless,
political	and	business	leaders	remain	rent-seekers.	In	such	a	case,	the	political	manager	needs	to	negotiate	both
revenue	and	spending,	making	a	double	bargain	with	financiers	and	clients.	Hence,	the	political	marketplace
functions	in	a	different	and	more	complex	manner.
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One	of	the	features	of	the	double	bargain,	is	that	the	key	players	in	the	business	sector	are	able	to	regulate	the
supply	of	political	finance	to	the	entire	political	marketplace.	The	financiers	therefore	have	the	option	of	either
sponsoring	competitors	in	a	patronage	marketplace,	or	taking	the	different	approach	of	regulating	political	finance
across	the	board.	If	commercial	financiers	of	politics	can	achieve	a	consensus	on	the	latter	approach,	they	have	the
possibility	of	establishing	a	stable	system	with	a	low	price	of	loyalty.
Third:	the	extent	to	which	control	over	the	means	of	organizing	violence	is	distributed	among	members	of	the	political
elite,	rather	than	being	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	the	ruler.
In	no	case	does	the	ruler	exercise	a	monopoly	on	the	legitimate	use	of	force.	However,	the	extent	of	centralization	of
coercive	capacity	varies.	In	all	cases,	a	key	instrument	for	keeping	those	intermediate	elites	in	line	is	financial
patronage,	and	in	some	cases,	it	is	the	only	instrument.
The	concentration	or	dispersion	of	control	over	the	means	of	violence	reflects	the	history	of	the	1980s	and	1990s.	At
that	time,	many	African	states	were	brought	to	the	brink	of	collapse,	such	that	state	budgets	were	insufficient	to
maintain	basic	governmental	functioning	(Bates	2008).	Additionally,	rulers	could	not	sustain	the	political	budgets
necessary	for	a	minimum	patronage	order,	so	that	the	political	survival	strategy	was	to	allocate	license	to	plunder	to
intermediate	elites—a	self-defeating	recourse	to	plunder.	The	crisis	of	political	budgets	was	accentuated	by	the
winding	down	of	the	Cold	War	and	the	scaling	back	of	superpower	security	rents	to	incumbents	(Laitin	1999),	and	by
rulers	trying	to	“coup-proof”	their	regimes	through	dividing	coercive	power	among	different	elements	of	the	armed
forces	and	security	forces	(cf.	Quinlivan	1999).	As	Bates	notes,	“things	fell	apart.”
The	recovery	from	that	collapse	followed	different	trajectories	depending	on	the	source	of	finance	and	the	distribution
of	control	over	the	means	in	violence.	Those	countries	that	were	undergoing	civil	wars	in	the	last	quarter	of	the	20th
century,	and	which	were	compelled	to	adopt	militia	strategies	for	counterinsurgency,	faced	a	structurally
insurmountable	task	of	centralizing	control	over	the	means	of	coercion.	The	only	means	was	negotiating	rental
agreements,	either	on	a	retail	basis	(individual	security	pacts)	or,	funds	permitting,	wholesale	(peace	agreements	that
involve	the	absorption	of	rebel	forces	into	larger,	inclusive	national	armies).
Consequently,	many	of	the	members	of	the	elite	who	can	organize	violence	are	both	formally	within	the	state
apparatus,	such	as	army	officers	or	heads	of	paramilitary	and	security	forces.	Others	are	outside	that	apparatus,
such	as	rebel	commanders	and	tribal	chiefs,	or	may	straddle	the	divide	between	government	and	society.	Different
components	of	the	political	budget	must	be	allocated	to	each.
For	a	member	of	the	provincial	elite	outside	the	apparatus,	a	major	way	of	staking	a	claim	to	more	resources	is	the
rent-seeking	rebellion.	By	staging	a	mutiny	or	rebellion,	a	commander,	chief	or	local	administrator	attracts	attention,
advertises	his	intent	and	determination,	and	strikes	up	a	round	of	bargaining.	This	is	conducted	through	violence	and
talking.	The	value	of	human	lives	taken	is	as	an	index	of	the	seriousness.	The	rebellion	is	settled	through	a	payroll
peace:	the	leader	is	given	a	promotion	and	his	fighters	are	put	on	the	army	payroll	(arrears	are	paid,	pay	rises
awarded,	and	more	soldiers—real	ones	and	ghosts—are	employed).
Violence	organized	in	this	way	intersects	with	identity	politics.	In	north-east	Africa,	the	most	characteristic	form	of	this
is	militarized	tribalism.	Armed	groups	are	constituted	on	the	basis	of	patronage	and	kinship:	their	leader
simultaneously	rewards	and	defrauds	his	soldiers.	Because	salaries	are	scarce,	the	leader	employs	his	kin.	Because
each	official	involved	in	disbursing	the	cash	for	wages	and	allowances	takes	a	cut,	they	are	never	as	much	as
advertised,	so	that	each	commander	is	short-changing	his	followers.	Co-ethnicity	is	part	of	the	bargain	to	minimize
the	risks	of	the	payroll	mutiny.	And	when	leader	or	fighters	stage	a	rebellion,	those	they	kill	first	are	members	of	other
tribes—traders	or	officials	from	other	ethnic	groups,	neighbouring	communities—and	the	conflict	takes	on	an	ethnic
character.	Meanwhile,	a	political	entrepreneur’s	instrumentalization	of	ethnicity	is	a	pact	with	the	custodians	of	that
identity—such	as	tribal	chiefs—who	try	to	assert	their	dwindling	authority	when	the	protagonists	begin	their	political
bargaining	to	settle	the	conflict.	This	bargaining	is	dressed	up	as	a	peace	process,	involving	community
representatives,	reconciliation	and	settlement	of	grievances.
A	ruler	with	a	strong	position	in	a	regional	marketplace	can	regulate	external	entrants	to	his	country’s
political	marketplace,	and	can	therefore	dominate	a	domestic	patronage	system,	at	an	affordable	cost.
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Several	other	key	characteristics	emerge	from	these	three	factors.	A	political	marketplace	system	is	turbulent,	fractal,
and	open	system.	Turbulence	is	drawn	from	fluid	dynamics	and	refers	to	the	way	in	which	a	poorly-regulated	system
is	unpredictable	and	apparently	chaotic	from	one	moment	to	the	next,	lacking	discernible	pattern,	but	still	maintains	a
recognizable	structure	over	a	longer	period	of	time.	Fractal	refers	to	the	way	in	which	the	same	patterns	of
bargaining	are	reproduced	at	all	levels:	local,	provincial,	national	and	inter-state.	Open-system	refers	to	the	way	in
which	the	system	is	amenable	to	innovation:	the	best	political	entrepreneurs	are	those	who	can	change	the
parameters	of	the	system,	for	example	by	finding	new	sources	of	income	or	new	means	of	reducing	patronage
outlays.
The	political	marketplace	is	a	highly	materialist,	instrumental	framework	that	provides	little	space	for	ideals	and
norms.	It	reduces	people	to	commodities.	People,	of	course,	resist.	People	attempt	to	regulate	the	political
marketplace	(usually	drawing	upon	culturally-legitimated	systems),	to	control	it	(using	coercion),	to	sabotage	or
evade	its	impacts	(c.f.	Scott	2009),	and	to	transform	politics	into	a	democratic	system.
Fourth,	the	terms	on	which	the	country’s	political	marketplace	is	regionally	and	internationally	integrated.
The	key	challenge	for	the	political	business	manager	is	that,	while	external	rents	are	the	most	lucrative,	it	is	critically
important	to	be	able	to	regulate	new	entrants	to	the	political	marketplace,	and	a	vital	mechanism	for	doing	this	is
minimizing	foreign	sponsorship	of	new	domestic	players.
A	ruler	with	a	strong	position	in	a	regional	marketplace	can	regulate	external	entrants	to	his	country’s	political
marketplace,	and	can	therefore	dominate	a	domestic	patronage	system,	at	an	affordable	cost.
However,	a	country	in	a	subordinate	position	in	a	regional	marketplace	is	at	a	severe	disadvantage,	in	that	its	ruler	is
not	in	a	position	to	regulate	the	price	of	loyalty.	No	matter	how	great	his	political	budget,	others	in	the	region	can
compete—and	indeed,	a	high	political	budget	will	just	heighten	the	competitive	stakes.	Therefore,	a	country	such	as
Somalia	(prone	to	regional	interference	since	the	late	1970s)	cannot	find	a	viable	internal	settlement	in	the
marketplace,	irrespective	of	whether	the	price	of	loyalty	is	high	or	low.
Increasingly,	the	political	marketplace	is	globally	integrated.	Thomas	Barnett	(2004)	described	the	countries	on	the
margins	of	North	America,	Europe	and	the	Far	East	as	“the	non-integrating	gap”	and	identified	them	as	the	major
security	threat	to	the	U.S.	in	the	twenty-first	century.	I	argue	that	these	countries	are	in	fact	well-integrated	into	the
global	order,	just	not	through	the	institutions	of	formal	globalization,	but	rather	through	flows	of	rent.	Insofar	as
political	instability,	corruption	and	chronic	violence	are	a	product	of	a	rentier	political	marketplace,	these	countries
generate	threats	that	led	U.S.	policymakers	to	identify	an	“arc	of	instability.”	In	turn,	U.S.	and	(to	a	lesser	degree,
European	and	Japanese)	security	policies	have	been	focused	on	assisting	rentier	governments	to	combat	these
threats,	or	intervening	directly	themselves.	The	paradigm	of	the	rentier	political	marketplace,	however,	suggests	that
such	assistance	and	intervention	will	only	serve	to	finance	the	rentierism,	increase	the	price	of	loyalty,	and	thereby
increase	the	turbulence	of	these	countries,	creating	a	vicious	cycle	whereby	threats	are	sustained	and	further	threats
are	generated.
United	States	military	and	security	assistance	is	only	one	element	in	the	emergent	global	patronage	system.	Private
sector	investment	can	also	play	a	role,	notably	in	the	minerals	sector,	and	especially	when	it	is	conjoined	with
business	practices	that	involve	profit	shifting	to	secrecy	jurisdictions	and	partnership	with	local	businesses	(invariably
with	connections	to	high	political	leaders),	that	serve	as	vehicles	for	primary	accumulation	and	the	circulation	of
public	funds	into	political	budgets.	Rents	from	transnational	organized	crime	are	another	element.	Regional	political
ambitions	from	middle-ranking	states,	especially	oil	producers,	also	fuel	regional	patronage	systems.
Intellectual	Debts
Much	of	the	framework	of	the	“political	marketplace”	is	adapted	from	Africanist	and	political	science	literature.	I	owe
many	intellectual	debts,	and	it	is	appropriate	to	pay	tribute	to	some	of	those	whose	insights	I	have	plundered.	Let	me
begin	with	Stanislav	Andreski,	who	first	coined	the	term	“kleptocracy”	in	his	study	of	the	first	few	years	of	Nigeria’s
independence.
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The	essence	of	kleptocracy	is	that	the	functioning	of	the	organs	of	authority	is	determined	by	the	mechanisms	of
supply	and	demand	rather	than	the	laws	and	regulations;	and	a	kleptocratic	state	constitutes	a	curiously	generalized
model	of	laissez-faire	economics	even	if	its	economy	is	nominally	socialist.	However,	like	pure	democracy	or	pure
autocracy,	pure	kleptocracy	is	an	‘ideal	type’	which	has	never	materialized,	because	everywhere	there	are	certain
bonds	of	solidarity	which	interfere	with	the	workings	of	supply	and	demand….	Normally	kleptocracy	is	not	‘pure’	but
intertwined	with	coercion	by	armed	force;	so	that	strategy	and	tactics	as	well	as	price	theory	are	needed	to	explain
the	functioning	of	a	system	consisting	of	a	mixture	of	venality	and	gangsterism.	(1968,	pp.	108-9)
In	common	parlance,	“kleptocracy”	refers	to	a	political	system	based	on	bribery	and	the	theft	of	public	property.
Andreski	defines	it	more	broadly,	as	a	system	without	public	institutions,	in	which	the	logic	of	the	marketplace
governs	the	allocation	of	governmental	office	and	the	purportedly	public	goods	that	government	allocates.	Given	the
way	in	which	the	common	understanding	of	kleptocracy	has	driven	Andreski’s	more	precise	social	scientific
definition,	I	use	the	term	sparingly.
Meles	Zenawi	preferred	“pervasive	rent-seeking,”	but	his	published	writings	do	not	contain	a	definition	of	the	term
(Zenawi	2012).	Also,	Meles	used	the	term	mainly	to	disparage	rather	than	to	analyze:	he	was	less	interested	in	the
dynamics	of	a	political	system	dominated	by	rent-seeking	than	in	how	to	stamp	it	out.	For	that	reason,	I	also	use	the
term	sparingly.
The	language	of	clientelism,	(neo-)patrimonialism,	rentierism	and	big	man	rule	was	already	prevalent	well	before
Africa’s	systemic	crises	of	the	1980s.	It	is	a	useful	paradigm,	sadly	under-utilized	outside	Africa.	Michael	Bratton	and
Nicolas	Van	de	Walle	usefully	define	neo-patrimonialism:
In	neo-patrimonial	regimes,	the	chief	executive	maintains	authority	through	personal	patronage,	rather	than	through
ideology	or	law.	As	with	classic	patrimonialism,	the	right	to	rule	is	ascribed	to	a	person	rather	than	to	an	office.	In
contemporary	neo-patrimonialism,	relationships	of	loyalty	and	dependence	pervade	a	formal	political	and
administrative	system	and	leaders	occupy	bureaucratic	offices	less	to	perform	public	service	than	to	acquire	personal
wealth	and	status.	The	distinction	between	private	and	public	interests	is	purposely	blurred.	The	essence	of	neo-
patrimonialism	is	the	award	by	public	officials	of	personal	favors,	both	within	the	state	(notably	public	sector	jobs)	and
in	society	(for	instance,	licenses,	contracts	and	projects).	In	return	for	material	reward,	clients	mobilize	political
support	and	refer	all	decisions	upward	as	a	mark	of	deference	to	patrons.	(1994,	p.	458)
Van	de	Walle	(2001)	argued	that	neo-patrimonial	governance	was	politically	resilient	but	economically	disastrous,
dictating	that	governments	supported	inefficient	clientelistic	systems	for	reasons	of	regime	survival.	This	is	surely
correct.	My	concern	here	is	slightly	different:	to	locate	different	forms	of	neo-patrimonial	governance	within	different
political-economic	circumstances.	Thus,	the	“warlord	politics”	that	afflicted	much	of	West	Africa	in	the	1990s	and
2000s,	described	and	analyzed	by	William	Reno	(1999;	2011)	represent	a	specific	conjuncture	of	factors,	creating	a
particular	historic	variant	of	neo-patrimonialism.	Since	then,	things	have	changed	again.	The	more	egregious
warlords	have	either	been	defeated	and	deposed,	or	become	respectable	gendarmes	for	former	colonial	powers.
New	forms	of	finance	have	emerged,	the	means	of	communication	and	convening	have	been	transformed	by	new
telecommunications	technologies,	and	political	markets	have	adjusted	accordingly.
I	suggest	that	the	framework	of	neo-patrimonialism,	like	that	of	kleptocracy,	is	relevant	and	useful	but	does	not	do	full
justice	to	the	dynamism	of	political	bargaining	under	changing	conditions.	Célestin	Monga	(1996,	p.	56)	argued	that
the	neo-patrimonial	paradigm	was	no	longer	operative:	“Even	the	most	extreme	forms	of	African	patrimonialism	have
undergone	revision.	Far	from	being	a	system	of	mere	privilege	trafficking	and	influence	peddling,	patrimonialism	is
attuned	to	the	social	exigencies	of	the	times	and	seeks	to	craft	a	type	of	power	that	is	less	direct	and	primitive,	more
equilibrated,	and	in	a	certain	sense,	interactive.”	Monga	writes	in	the	tradition	of	Jean-François	Bayart	(2009),
Christopher	Clapham	(1996)	and	Patrick	Chabal	(2009)	who	stress	the	continuities	in	forms	of	African	governance,
and	their	adaptability	to	circumstances.	Much	of	this	literature	stresses	the	importance	of	factors	rooted	in	culture,
kinship	organization	and	religion	(Mbembe	2001;	Schatzberg	2001;	Ellis	and	ter	Haar	2004).	I	prefer	to	focus	on	the
material	factors	that	drive	change,	rather	than	the	cultural	factors	that	ensure	continuities.	Those	cultural	factors	can
be	seen	as	factors	regulating	the	hard	facts	of	cash	and	coercion:	my	main	concern	is	with	those	brute	realities.	One
reason	for	this	is	that	the	paradigm	of	the	political	marketplace	resonates	outside	Africa,	in	very	different	social	and
cultural	contexts.
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The	phenomenon	of	politics	as	a	marketplace	of	provisional	allegiances	has	not	only	prevailed,	but	has	become
dollarized,	regionally	integrated,	and	with	accelerated	bargaining.	Both	driver	and	symptom	of	these	changes	is	the
increased	price	of	loyalty,	reflecting	the	greater	bargaining	power	of	clients.
Political	science	has	been	concerned	with	the	transition	from	a	patronage-based	political	system	to	an
institutionalized	one	or	a	developmental	state	(c.f.	Olson	1993;	Tilly	1990;	North	et	al.	2009),	and	the	emergence	of
social	movements,	democracy	and	nationalism	(Anderson	1983;	Tarrow	1994).	This	literature	contains	rich	insights
about	political	systems	that	have	not	made	this	transition,	including	those	at	the	cusp	of	it.	The	World	Bank’s	World
Development	Report	2011,	“Conflict	Security	and	Development,”	(World	Bank	2011)	represents	an	ambitious	effort	at
bringing	this	powerful	current	of	political	science	to	bear	on	contemporary	challenges	of	fragile	states.	However,	the
WDR	2011	bears	the	hallmarks	of	institutional	pressures	to	emphasize	the	potential	for	conventional	state-building,
not	the	alternative	trajectories	of	governance.
My	analysis	differs	in	two	main	respects:	the	historical	specification	of	the	factors	for	state-building	and	the	main
focus	of	analytical	attention.
The	transitions	identified,	from	different	disciplines,	by	Olson,	Tilly,	and	North,	are	based	upon	the	history	of	state
building	in	Europe	and	North	America.	At	its	simplest,	this	model	contains	a	ruler	who	has	a	dominant	position	with
regard	to	using	organized	violence,	and	intermediate	landowning	and	commercial	elites	that	control	the	key
resources.	This	leads	to	a	“protection	racket”	governing	system	in	which	the	ruler	abandons	primary	accumulation	for
regularized	tribute	and	taxation.	The	space	for	communication	and	convening	has	several	important	elements:	it	is
organized	around	national	communication	and	convening	infrastructures	such	as	newspapers,	languages	and
parliaments;	it	is	contested	on	roughly	equal	terms	between	ruler	and	intermediate	elites;	and	the	opportunities	for
bargaining	are	scarce,	so	that	once	a	deal	has	been	struck,	it	is	likely	to	remain	in	place	for	decades.	These	three
factors	generate	a	fourth:	nationally-distinctive	bargains	can	emerge,	creating	both	nation	and	state	through
interwoven	processes.	Altogether,	this	allows	for	the	emergence	of	stable	rules	of	the	political	game.
Contemporary	political	marketplace	systems	differ	on	all	key	variables.	The	ruler	possesses	(much,	or	most	of)	the
national	revenue,	by	virtue	of	state	rents.	Control	over	organized	violence	is	widely	distributed	among	the
intermediate	elites,	both	those	ostensibly	within	the	governing	system	and	those	outside	it.	And	thirdly,	historically
these	peripheral	governance	systems	are	constituted	around	centralized	monopoly	over	communication	and
convening,	which	has	recently	and	rapidly	been	transformed	by	new	transport	and	communications	infrastructure
and	technology.	And	lastly,	all	these	factors	operate	across	boundaries	and	are	integrated	into	a	global	economic,
security	and	political	order.	This	defines	a	very	different	trajectory	of	state-building	today	in	comparison	to	even	the
recent	past.	Fifty	years	ago,	nation-	and	state-building	formulae	might	have	delivered.	Now	the	task	is	almost
impossible.
Consequently,	the	main	concern	of	the	“political	marketplace”	framework	is	with	the	actual	functioning	of	political
systems	that	have	not	made	the	transition	to	institutionalized	states,	because	they	are	not	likely	to	make	any	such
transition	in	the	foreseeable	future.
Additionally,	I	am	concerned	with	how	those	relatively	institutionalized	or	developmental	states	interact	with	political
marketplace	systems,	and	especially	the	ways	in	which	the	rentier	political	marketplace	can	corrode	or	overwhelm	an
institutionalized	or	developmental	state.	In	addition,	I	suggest	that	this	form	of	globalized	patronage	system	may
challenge	elements	of	institutional	globalization	at	an	international	level,	and	that	the	U.S.,	in	particular,	should	guard
against	the	danger	that	its	role	as	a	promoter	of	a	globalized	political	marketplace,	may	generate	precisely	the
security	threats	it	is	seeking	to	suppress.
And	finally,	we	must	ask,	what	can	be	the	process	whereby	a	political	marketplace	system	does	transform	into	one
that	can	produce	public	goods?
The	article	was	first	published	on	the	Reinventing	Peace	blog.	
Professor	Alex	de	Waal	is	a		Executive	Director	of	the	World	Peace	Foundation	at	the	Fletcher	School,	Tufts
University	and	a	Professorial	Research	Fellow	at	LSE.	He	has	worked	in	north-east	Africa	for	thirty	years,	including
as	adviser	to	the	African	Union	on	Sudan.
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